Can the Law School Succeed? A Proposal by Robert Borosage
Yale Review of Law and Social Action
Volume 1
Issue 1 Yale Review of Law and Social Action Article 8
1971
Can the Law School Succeed? A Proposal
Robert Borosage
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yrlsa
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Review of Law and Social Action by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert Borosage, Can the Law School Succeed? A Proposal, 1 Yale Rev. L. & Soc. Action (1971).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yrlsa/vol1/iss1/8
by Robert Borosage 
Robert Borosage is a student 
at the Yale Law School 
Can the Law School Succeed? A Proposal 
The crisis of the university has finally affected the law 
school. Its symptoms are evident to all: the growing 
disaffection among students with traditional teaching 
methods; the increasing ambivalence of younger faculty and 
students about the value of studying the law; the spreading 
boredom in law classes; the escalating protests by students 
over school issues. To comprehend the sources of the 
problems, it is necessary to view the law school in its 
societal context. 
Law schools have served a definite channeling function 
in society. Their role has been to train "legal professionals," 
preparing students for entrance into the corporate law firm 
and the managerial elite. Nothing better illustrates the 
bankruptcy of legal education than the pride with which 
the law school has accepted such an inherently limited 
role. 1 
As a professional school, the law school could, as Ralph 
Nader has written, have articulated "a theory and practice 
of the just deployment of legal manpower." With its 
accumulated resources, available manpower and great 
prestige, the law school could have attempted to define and 
protect the public interest in the legal process, or at 
minimum, those interests which were poorly represented. 
Instead, those at the bottom of the professional hierarchy, 
the criminal lawyer and the general practitioner, have been 
both neglected and disdained. The legal profession has been 
even more remiss than the medical establishment in its lack 
of concern over an equitable delivery of services to the 
poor. The law school, serving the wealthy and the powerful, 
has ignored these roles. 
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As an academic institution, the law school might have 
deemphasized the role of a trade school and adopted that 
of a graduate center for the study of law. It could have 
devoted itself both to empirical study of the actual 
functioning of our legal system and to normative inquiry 
into the role and nature of law. Instead, the law shoo! has 
abandoned the basic responsibilities of an academic 
institution, and accepted its poor part as the training 
ground for skillful technicians for the corporate 
elite. 
This limited channeling function of the school has had a 
profound effect on the structure and content of legal 
education, and has been a primary factor in the increasing 
student protests in the law school. A description of Yale 
Law School before the advent of vocal student opposition 
will illustrate the interrelationship between the channeling 
function and the institutional arrangements which 
characterized the law school. 
I 
Intense competition and the "socratic case method" were 
the primary determinants of the educational atmosphere. 
Competition for recognition began upon entrance to the 
school, intensified by the large impersonal size of first-year 
classes. Such recognition was imparted by academic success: 
initially by facility in classroom debate, and later by grades 
on semester and year-end examinations. The intensity of 
the competition was heightened, if rendered somewhat 
absurd, by the virtual absence of papers or independent 
work as additional bases for academic differentiation. (At 
Yale each student wrote a first-semester memo, but it was 
generally not given much weight in the semester grading.) 
After the first year, competition decreased, as students 
accepted their roles in the institutional hierarchy. 
Mr. Kennedy has adequately described the dynamic of 
the misnamed "socratic method." What must be empha-
sized is the autocratic nature of the classroom. The 
professor determined the parameters of the discussion, 
called on people to respond and ruled on the relevancy of 
any student comment. -~.foreover, all discussion was 
predicated on the existence of ideological unanimity. The 
professor's assumptions, undefined and unrevealed, were to 
be accepted by each of the students, This led to rather 
amusing results-property taught as if the. market system 
still worked, and antitrust as if the notion of state 
capitalism had never occurred to anyone. 
Competition for grades and classroom success led 
students to .adopt an instrumental conception of know-
ledge. The emphasis of the teaching was on the "correct," 
the woodenly logical, the facile, and the suitable qualified 
answer. Knowledge was a tool for success in the educational 
hustle.2 Intellectual curiosity was subordinated to plodding 
mastery of course material. 
In this competitive atmosphere, fellow students were 
generally perceived as rivals. Peer group discussions 
constantly dwelled on the intellectual capability of fellow 
students, and particularly on whether a given student was 
"bright." Conversations often mimicked the socratic 
classroom method, as each student maneuvered to expose 
the logical inconsistencies of the other with appropriate 
acerbic sarcasm. The broadest topics-politics, art, music, 
literature-were treated like classroom queries: there was 
presumed to be one logical position and many illogical 
ones, one rationa-1 viewpoint and many irrational ones. 
Given the channeling function of the school, the 
development of these traits served a socializing function. 
Professional success required a highly competitive life style, 
and law students, accustomed to long hours of study and 
competitive peer group relationships, accepted such a life 
style as natural. Covering one's hand, manipulating 
colleagues, appearing to be "right" about a variety of 
subjects were all necessary for success in the educational 
hustle. The skillful hustler may not become the most 
judicious advocate or the most just functionary, but he is 
sure to be numbered among the law school's most 
"successful" graduates. 
The curriculum of the law school was directly related to 
the school's perceived role. Many of its offerings mirrored 
the demands of the corporate law firm practice-corpora-
tions, tax, securities, secured transactions, commercial 
transactions. Courses which reflected an equally instru-
mental view of legal education, but different priorities-
courses in environmental planning, consumer protection, 
tenant's rights-were conspicuously absent. More impor-
tant, courses in public schools, land development and the 
like were taught in a curious vacuum. Supported neither by 
empirical research nor by a searching theoretical analysis, 
such "policy courses" were taught from a sheltered 
manager's point of view. Policy discussions consisted of 
balancing packaged value-considerations against each other, 
and considered neither the hard concrete questions nor the 
broadest fundamental issues. 
Reinforcing and perpetuating the channeling function 
and institutional characteristics of the law school was its 
hierarchical organization. Status in the hierarchy corre-
sponded with the distribution of power and space-both 
psychological and physical. 
The elite of the hierarchy were, of course, the law school 
faculty, an almost classic elite-inbred, self-perpetuating, 
and in possession of all decision-making power. Faculty 
members met to decide which courses were to be offered 
and which required. Grading systems, admission standards 
and credit arrangements were all established by the faculty. 
The faculty perpetuated itself, recruiting and selecting 
the future members of the elite and voting to decide who 
would receive tenure. The faculty thus consisted of men 
with remarkably similar experiences. General teaching 
techniques and mannerisms became institutionalized. Each 
succeeding generation of professors assumed, more or less 
consciously, the roles which its predecessors played. 
The faculty possessed the greatest space-both physical 
and psychological-in the school. In regard to physical 
space, faculty members had their own offices, secretarial 
service, a separate carpeted lounge, their own rest rooms, 
and even a separate dining room adjacent to and, appropri-
ately, two steps above the student dining room. The 
faculty's psychological space was expressed in their claim to 
extensive "academic freedom." Law professors claimed a 
contractual entitlement to teach what they wished in the 
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manner they wished. They considered their non-classroom 
hours as private time. Although most took part in running 
committees and attending faculty meetings, many limited 
their contacts with students, giving their time and attention 
only to a select few. 
The next level of the hierarchy was made up of 
successful students, primarily law journal editors. These 
students, victorious in the competition for academic 
recognition, possessed greater power and space in the law 
school than their less fortunate colleagues. Their access to 
the faculty provided them with the opportunity to 
influence the decisions of the power elite. In terms of 
physical space, they has access to journal offices and 
facilities; and editors had their own offices, secretarial 
services, keys to the library and, most appreciated, 
telephone charge privileges. In terms of psychological 
freedom, journal members, as Mr. Kennedy notes, were 
treated with more respect in class, and were given greater 
opportunities to design courses or undertake directed 
study. 
The mass of students, of course, had very limited power 
and space. The decisions on curriculum, grading, and credit 
arrangements were made without their vote or influence. 
Their physical space was represented by the austere public 
areas of the school, with a cramped stall in the library for 
the studious. In psychological terms, they were expected to 
show deference to the views of faculty members, and felt 
the full force of the faculty's disdain for students. Most 
important, they were faced with the frustration of their 
own self-doubt for having failed to measure up to the 
standards of success. 
With the faculty acting as the proud guardians of 
tradition, the hierarchical structure of the law school both 
perpetuated and reinforced its channeling function. This 
organization was acceptable as long as students adhered to 
the basic assumptions of the institution. With ideological 
unanimity and consensus on the uses of a legal education, it 
was not unreasonable or particularly noxious that 
professors should govern the institution. Students in the 
fifties and early sixties generally accepted their roles. They 
concerned themselves with the mastery of materials which 
professors chose to teach, and with the struggle to "learn 
how to think." Theirs was a jealous mistress, and even for 
those who found her unattractive and petty, fidelity was 
mandatory. 
At the same time, the late fifties and early sixties 
marked the beginning of the law school decline. The civil 
rights struggle was but the beginning of a sustained outcry 
against the inequities of the American system. In its early 
years the civil rights movement rejuvenated the law schools. 
There was a liberal, glamorous President and an active, 
innovative Supreme Court. Students and professors alike 
responded to the needs of the civil rights movement 
(professors, at first, to a far greater degree than students). 
The law was viewed as a tool for social change. Discrimina-
tory statutes were erased from the books; the Supreme 
Court found ingenious ways to strike at segregation and to 
protect the civil rights demonstrators. The political system, 
it was thought, would respond to the challenges of racism 
and the "other America." To be trained in the law, for 
those with a social conscience, was to be trained to create 
change. In 1964 we elected a liberal President, pledged to a 
Great Society and to a peace in the Viet Nam war. 
We are now six long years from that election. For the 
new generation of students, the war and the surfacing of 
terrible societal inequities have been central formative 
experiences. The best of a whole generation of Americans 
have been gassed in the streets. What C. Wright Mills justly 
termed the "celebration of American politics" has ended. 
For many the legitimacy of the political system has been 
called into question. The choice between Humphrey and 
Nixon travestied the notion of a democratic election. The 
centralized federal bureaucracies have proven both 
unresponsive to the public they affected and negligent of a 
general public interest. This was manifest in the prosecution 
of the war, dramatized in the urban removal of the inner 
city, and elaborated by the growing evidence of govern-
mental complicity in actions against the public interest, 
from the licensing of oil wells off the California coast to the 
testing of CBW's by the military. 
The natural result was that students came to the law 
school unwilling to accept its limited channeling function. 
They sought instead answers to larger questions: about the 
just ordering of a society, about the relation of legal tools 
to social change, and about the relation of the law to basic 
concepts of fairness. They wished to address the moral · 
implications of making policy for a government of 
questionable legitimacy. Many wanted to learn legal skills in 
order to use the law for the benefit of people at the bottom 
of the social scale. 
The law school which they entered, however, was 
neither prepared for nor receptive to their queries. 
Moreover, the law school itself reflected the inequities of 
the society. Its admissions policy had resulted in de facto 
discrimination against the female, the poor, and the 
minority group member. Its curricular decisions and 
resource allocations mirrored and reinforced the inequitable 
distribution of legal manpower. Its placement office 
facilitated the interviewing of corporate law firms, and 
made little or no effort to assist those students interested in 
other occupations. 
More important, the value of its education was called 
into question. Its most brilliant graduates and professors 
had become policy-makers, and had directed the prosecu-
tion of the war, the urban displacement of the poor, the 
repression of war dissenters. In honoring its graduates it 
chose those who had followed the desired channel. In doing 
so, it inevitably suffered embarrassments-as at Yale, where 
the last two graduates to be honored with portraits were 
Abe Fortas and Eugene Rostow. 
Disaffection with the law school as an institution 
antipathetic to meaningful social change was inevitable. The 
initial response of the disaffected was partial ~efusal to 
accept the direction and values of the law school's track to 
success, a refusal usually manifested in an attempt to create 
personal and pyschological space. 
Many had recourse to intellectual flight, characterized 
by Mr. Kennedy as "compartmentalization." Like 
intellectuals in Stalin's Russia, students played one role in 
public and another in private. They went throught the 
motions of acquiring a legal education, but contributed as 
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little of themselves as possible to the process. Others made 
vocal demands for space in the law school, expressed in 
requests for fewer required courses, a "more relevant 
education," smaller classes, and increased diversity in the 
curriculum. 
As students began to view their personal space as 
centrally important, interest in traditional classes dropped 
off, and automatic acceptance of the defined roles of the 
institution diminished. Denunciations of the "socratic 
method" and of the hustle which passed for legal education 
were not merely expressions of discontent but also 
ritualized declarations of independence from such 
institutional practices. 
The initial faculty response to vocal demands for space 
was one of accomodation. Since the demands threatened 
neither faculty space nor the role of the institution, 
concessions were forthcoming. Students were granted a 
sprinkling of urban and poverty law courses. At Yale an 
intensive semester was established in which a student could 
spend a semester working and /or studying outside the 
school and receive full credit. Student activities in the 
surrounding community, if not encouraged, were at least 
not denounced. 
Yet neither the basic function nor the structure of the 
law school was greatly affected by such changes. Some of 
the pressure for conforming performance was removed 
from the individual students, but the law school's role was 
not altered. No attempt was made to develop a curriculum 
which could address the broader dilemmas which new 
students faced. The necessary reassessment of the law in the 
face of social change was not even hinted at. No professor 
led his students into a critical evaluation of the American 
political and legal system. The new courses, held in disdain 
by many of the faculty, were taught in the old way-from 
appellate court opinions and by the "socratic method." 
For the individual student, the increased freedom 
facilitated withdrawal; yet withdrawal frequently led only 
to an enervating anomie. Frustrated and insecure students 
who had undertaken many activities as undergraduates 
often spent their free time doing virtually nothing. In the 
classroom there was mounting indifference to discussion 
and to the learning process generally. The law school 
became increasingly dysfunctional for the more sensitive of 
its constituents. 
Creation of individual space also stimulated demands 
for group space. The result was the creation of semi-autono-
mous counter-communities, supportive of heretical 
individual responses to the law school. At Yale and 
elsewhere, the prime example has been the formation and 
growth of the Black Law Students Union, an expression of 
the personal pressures and sense of alienation felt by black 
law students in a white school. Black students are generally 
ambivalent about the study of the law; while they realize 
more than most that legal skills are valuable both personally 
and for serving those of their race who are colonized in the 
ghetto communities (which often border law schools), they 
are at the same time skeptical about the operation of law in 
society. Furthermore, black students are sensitive to the 
limitations of the law school itself, and most have little 
affinity for the channeling goals of the institution. They are 
a small minority in a white school, in part because of the 
institution's admission policies. They directly feel the 
shortcomings of the curriculum and of the stilted views 
which pass for reality in the classroom. The personal 
demands of the law school atmosphere come into direct 
conflict with black consciousness and style, qualities which 
black students are loath to surrender. 
It is not surprising that the black students have led the 
demands for group space in the law school. Interestingly, 
one of the Yale BLSU's first demands was for physical 
space-a black table in the dining hall, an office-lounge, a 
bulletin board. The BLSU has also served to create some 
psychological space for black students in the law school, 
providing a group of students with which each can be 
informal and relaxed. The creation of group space has had a 
political expression also. The Yale BLSU, like others across 
the nation, has demanded changes in discriminatory 
institutional practices-new admissions policies, the 
addition of "black courses" to the curriculum. It has begun 
to articulate a concept of institutional responsibility in its 
demand that the institution become involved in the 
community which it borders. 
Another group which has demanded space is the "legal 
hippies" (or yippies, since law students all tend to be 
somewhat political). 3 The primary expression of the 
"yippies" in their search for space has been a community 
based upon a counter life-style. Members· of the group 
adopt the style of the new youth culture in their dress, hair 
length, music and reading tastes, and, of course, in their 
experimentation with drugs. The legal yippies' search for 
space led at Yale to the establishment of a tent village in 
the quad courtyard. Camping out in the courtyard for most 
of the fall served both to establish a sanctuary in which 
students could escape the law school atmosphere, and to 
demonstrate to other members of the law school a 
counter-community with new values. 
A third group in the law school is represented by the law 
school's activists, 4 who are generally more self-assertive 
and more competitive than the hippies and thus less 
alienated from the law school. This group's demands for 
space have taken two major forms. First-year radical 
students have tended to fulfill their need for group space at 
the student meeting, where they have been able to unleash 
their bitterness toward the law school and its institutional 
arrangements, and to discuss change with a generally 
sympathetic audience of fellow activists. Thus first-year 
activism has primarily taken the form of demands for 
institutional reform. Second~ and third-year radicals have 
tended to abandon the frustrating and aggravating search 
for group space within the law school. They have generally 
withdrawn from the law school and attempted to undertake 
the development of a radical critique alone or by immersing 
themselves in community activities, from working with 
welfare rights groups to assisting poverty lawyers. 
The formation of group space in the law school has had 
some beneficial results. The groups have provided support 
and reinforcement for students who reject the law school's 
channeling function and role definitions. Their formation 
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has demonstrated that the channeling function is generally 
discredited among students in the law school. The personal 
cost of alienation from the school has been diminished by 
the existence of group support. The political demands of 
the groups and their partial fulfillment have increased the 
diversity of the law school in course offerings and in credit 
arrangements. Competition has somewhat diminished, in 
part because many students have simply refused to compete 
in traditional ways, and in part because of some grade 
reform, pass-fail courses, and a major de-emphasis of the 
law journal's status. 
On the whole, however, the formation of group space 
has had inimical effects on the law school. The process of 
forming groups-the making of demands, the challenging of 
normal-standards-has increased the isolation of the group 
members from the rest of the community. The law school 
population is now polarized. The faculty disdain for 
students, as Professor Edward Sparer has noted, has 
increasingly been met with student disdain for professors, 
as intellectually arrogant professors come into contact with 
politically arrogant students. The student body itself is 
divided and inter-group communication is infrequent. Due 
to the increased polarization and the large number of 
students withdrawn into individual or group space, 
indifference and vapidity continue to characterize law 
classes. The intellectual excitement which should result 
from the clash of differing perceptions and opinions is 
absent from the law school. 
Most important, the beneficial changes resulting from 
the creation of space for students have had no significant 
effect on either the perceived channeling function of the 
law school or upon the institutional arrangements which 
uphold it. The faculty has granted only those demands for 
space which did not infringe upon their own. At Yale, the 
faculty agreed to admit more minority group members, but 
refused to permit students to review applications. They 
agreed grudgingly to a small grade reform, but ignored 
requests for greater individual evaluation. After much furor, 
they permitted a few students to attend faculty meetings, 
but refused to give them voting representation. 
Neither a reassessment of the role of law nor a new 
analysis of the responsibilities and functions of the law 
school has taken place. The faculty has refused to 
reappraise legal education. In spite of the valiant efforts of 
a few individual professors, most courses still entail 
excursions through appellate court opinions; students are 
still expected to accept gratefully the role of diligent, 
attentive, and respectful acolytes perched beneath the 
lectern altar. 
Increased demands by disaffected students and 
continued faculty intransigence result in a very heated 
situation. It is important to delineate the various aspects of 
the crisis. First, there is a growing disagreement between 
faculty and students over the content, means and ends of 
legal education. Many black students and some activists 
have demanded that legal education include more clinical 
experiences, experiences in the community combined with 
related class work. Inherent in this demand is a concept of 
institutional commitment to the problems and desires of 
the surrounding community. At the same time, many 
students have demanded that the law school offer more 
academic approaches to the law, that it provide opportu-
nities for those who wish to develop an analysis of the 
operation of law and the legal system. Both groups reject 
the traditional channeling function of the law school. 
Second, and of course related to the former, is the fact that 
an increasing number of students now feel that the 
institutional arrangements of the law school are illegitimate. 
They find the hierarchical structure of the law school both 
personally detrimental and institutionally divisive. As the 
student search for space has gone beyond an unsatisfactory 
retreat into individual space to an active demand for space 
within the institution, their demands have increasingly 
come into conflict with the present structure of the law 
school. The result of these two interrelated conflicts is a 
growing polarization of the law school. 
Group demands are likely to escalate as sympathetic 
involvement with the school lessens. The combination 
portends a future of increased disruption. Such challenges 
can only be detrimental to the students involved and to the 
institution itself. Yet the pressing need for reform remains; 
the demands for change will not cease. A means must be 
found to effect change in the law school. 
II 
Effecting radical change in an institution, particularly an 
educational institution, is a difficult task. Excluding 
revolutionary take-over; two possible alternatives come to 
mind. 
The first is one suggested by Paul Goodman in the 
"Community of Scholars," and one with which the 
majority of the law school faculty would certainly be in 
agreement. In a sense, it is the logical extension of the 
efforts to create group space; it is, simply, that the 
disaffected students locate some disaffected professors, 
secede and form a counter-law school dedicated to a radical 
reassessment of the law and committed to some degree of 
activity in the surrounding community. In a sense, this may 
be the only practical means of reforming the law school, 
but I have many difficulties with it. First, assuming that the 
revolution doesn't come tomorrow, the traditional Jaw 
schools will continue to produce what they define as a legal 
professional. Many of these people will become our 
governors. Their exposure to a radical critique of the legal 
system and of the state seems both desirable and necessary. 
Secession only isolates radical opinion, and would therefore 
be detrimental to the development of av.able radical 
alternative for the country. Secondly, secession is not a 
viable alternative for those of the disaffected who would 
want to be licensed by the bar. More important, many of 
the disaffected are not prepared to drop out and proceed 
independently. Genuinely convinced that drastic reform of 
American institutions is necessary, many students are still 
at a stage of asking questions, of seeking to develop new 
analyses of the law and the political system. For those of us 
seeking answers to such broad queries, the clash of opinion 
and perspective which might be achieved if the present Jaw 
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school were reformed would be both stumulating and 
rewarding. Finally, there is a basic problem with resources. 
The present disaffection of students creates demands for 
more faculty time, and for more opportunities and 
alternatives to be made available. These resources can be 
found only in existing institutions. 
The second alternative is the one which I would like to 
explore. That is that the members of the law school 
community undertake the reconstruction of the law school. 
Before listing the benefits of such an activity, I will suggest 
one means by which that reconstruction can take place. 
The reconstruction of the law school should take the 
form of the development of a new institutional constitu-
tion. Although it might be preferable for this to be done by 
oral agreement, it is probable that it could only occur by 
the drafting and adoption of a written document. The 
reconstruction process should take place at a convention of 
all the members of the law school, held at the beginning of 
the school year over a period of two weeks. 5 
The constituents would consider three major topics. 
First, the form and content of legal education would be 
discussed at a series of meetings. Students and faculty 
members would elaborate their conceptions of the purpose 
of legal education. The demands which students would 
make on resources, the curriculum, and faculty time would 
be articulated. Substantive educational reform would 
finally be discussed by the community in open forum and 
with the prospect that proposed changes would ultimately 
be implemented. 
This series of meetings would consider two major areas. 
First, the issues on which the faculty and deans have 
traditionally made decisions-course offerings, grading 
system, credit arrangements, resource allocations-would be 
discussed. Secondly, the constituent convention could 
consider questions which the faculty has either slighted or 
not considered germane in the past-questions of major 
educational reform, teaching techniques, and issues like the 
responsibility of the institution to the surrounding 
community. The convention would not make final 
decisions on either educational policy or institutional 
responsibility. The discussion would outline areas of 
agreement and disagreement for the school governing 
bodies to investigate. 
The second topic for consideration would be the 
establishment of the governing bodies of the law school and 
the elaboration of rules for their composition and 
operation. Included, presumably, would be a legislative 
council (made up of faculty, student and employee 
representatives), an executive of elected and/or appointed 
administrative personnel, and a committee system. 
In constituting these bodies, individuals and groups 
would undoubtedly demand certain guaranteed space and 
rights. In part, these would be protected by limitations on 
the powers of the governing bodies. Additionally, a bill of 
rights would undoubtedly be detailed, listing those rights 
deemed inviolate by the constituents, and providing 
protection for individual and group space for students and 
faculty. 
A third group of meetings would be directed toward 
establishing guidelines for the working conditions, house 
arrangements and physical operation of the law school. The 
school schedule, the working, living and lounging con-
ditions for staff, students and faculty would be discussed. 
The hired staff (secretaries, librarians, food service and 
janitorial employees) would explain their needs and 
suggestions for reform. Such suggestions might include 
greater recognition for their labors, increased involvement 
in law school activities, and new forms of cooperation {free 
legal and investment advice, opportunities to work with law 
students on community projects, etc.) The allocation of 
physical space would also be considered. 6 
What is the importance of such "tinkering with the 
structure," as Mr. Kennedy would call it (citing the Beatles 
in support)? First, reconstitution is desirable if the law 
school is to remain a viable educational institution. As 
noted above, continued creation of group space can only 
weaken the institution. Escalating struggles over student 
rights can only consume time better spent in discussions of 
educational reform, and in study of the law. By legitimizing 
the governing structure, reconstitution would remove many 
of the petty issues which are constantly blown out of 
proportion in student-faculty confrontations. Ideally, it 
would bring about a new consensus on the roles and 
responsibilities of the law school. Minimally it would result 
in more distributive justice. The governing structures would 
be more representative of all members of the community; 
the curriculum more balanced, with programs available for 
students with differing interests. The institution would 
direct its students to a variety of careers, from public 
interest law to the State Department to radical politics, and 
its placement office, faculty, curriculum, and teaching 
methods would reflect that diversity. 
Second, if the channeling function of the law school is 
to be changed, or at least broadened, structltral change is 
necessary. The status hierarchy of the law school perpet-
uates its limited function. Faculty members, who now 
determine institutional direction are committed by 
education and experience to the maintenance of that 
function. If the role of the school is to be changed, the 
institution must be made more responsive to the objectives 
of its students. 
Third, the process of reconstitution takes faculty and 
students out of their role positions, and places them in the 
position of equals attempting to reconcile necessarily 
differing interests, fears and goals. The very communication 
of such concerns by the participants would increase 
sensitivity and comprehension on all sides. The first 
meetings of the constituent convention would reveal to 
both professors and students the underlying consensus 
which I believe exists among virtually all members of the 
law school. Numerous faculty members have now 
popularized the line that the problems of the law school are 
due to the fact that legal hippies, activists and many of the 
black students should not be in the school at all, that they 
do not want "to be professionals,'' and thus "do not want a 
legal education." Numerous students have loudly suggested 
that, if the law shcool is ever to be minimally acceptable, 
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mass resignations of the faculty are necessary. 7 Yet, there is 
a general student commitment to a stimulating education 
and environment and to the acquisition of at least minimal 
legal tools. There is manifest student respect for the 
intellectual acuity of their professors. There is increasing 
faculty concern about the "relevance" of legal education, 
and the methods of teaching the law. 
The recognition of a consensus would be the basis for a 
minimal trust and confidence which presently does not 
exist. All groups in the law school could diminish their 
self-imposed isolation, and their members reduce their 
paranoia. The commitment to change represented by the 
reconstitution process, the exchange of ideas and concerns, 
and the mutual confidence engendered would lead to a 
lowering of voices. Proposals for reform could be discussed 
and analyzed, rather than shouted and sloganized. The 
members of the institution would finally benefit from the 
clash of ideas and diversity of opinions of the school's 
disparate constituency. 8 
Finally, educational institutions have always provided 
the place for experimentation relevant to the problems of 
society. It is desirable that the law school direct its 
attention to the problem of institutional restructuring. 
There is little question that a reordering of American 
institutions must occur. Many members of the school, both 
faculty and students, will be involved in the restructuring of 
other institutions. With its small size and unexcelled 
intellectual resources, the law school is the ideal place for 
experimentation with institutional restructuring to take 
place. The process of restructuring would be an educational 
and intellectual experience of great value. 
As a political expression, reconstitution would 
demonstrate the profession's commitment to make legal 
education, the profession and the law itself relevant to the 
problems which presently plague American society. At a 
time when the moral legitimacy of the law and the 
authority of legal institutions has been deeply discredited, 
the restructuring of the law school would demonstrate the 
possibility of change without violence, of reconstruction 
without revolution. 
Since this proposal calls for radical reconstruction of the 
law school by democratic means, it has faced indictment by 
both the left and the right. 
First, some of my radical friends who have established a 
meaningful existence in work and communities outside of 
the law school accuse me of parochialism, of failing to 
realize that the law school is, in Vonnegut's memorable 
phrase, a "grand falloon," not a true community, and that 
political reform of the law school is a waste of time. This 
argument, however, ignores the effect of the law school as 
an institution in society. Abdication of responsibility by 
students in the law school has led to the structural 
inequities, the destructive institutional practices and the 
distorted channeling function which characterize the law 
school. The members of the school must now direct their 
attention to these problems. 
Second, other acquaintances excoriate my utopianism. 
My refusal to analyze the faculty's class interests, they 
claim, has led me to underestimate their resistance to such a 
proposal. They note that the difference between the 
beloved older professors at Yale (Kessler, James, Moore) 
and the younger generation is due to the development of 
class mentality among the younger. The older professors, 
they argue, are dedicated to teaching, respect and love their 
students, and evoke sympathetic responses in return. The 
younger professors are more concerned with their 
professional prerogatives and stature; teaching is strictly 
secondary. They are intellectual picaros, seeking greater 
fame and fortune. Thus they will react viciously to any 
suggestions which impinge upon their privileges. 
This argument is a potent one. The ill will which exists 
between professors and students seems to increase each 
semester. It is not likely that the faculty would readily 
accept reconstitution without further embittering 
disruption. They may, however, find it necessary to do just 
that. As has been noted above, until a commitment to 
reform is articulated and the governance of the law school 
gains some minimal legitimacy, time which should be spent 
in academic discussion will be consumed by recurrent 
crises. I believe that in the end, most professors at the law 
school want to teach, to enter into the stimulating 
intellectual relationships implied by that word. While I 
admit it is unlikely that the faculty would willingly 
undertake the radical step of reconstitution, I find it still 
harder to believe that they would steadfastly resist if they 
thought reconstitution a practical solution to the law 
school's difficulties. 
A third criticism is implied in the Kennedy article: since 
the problem in the law school is a matter of faculty-student 
relationships and substantive educational reform, structural 
reforms are irrelevant. I must disagree. The rigid role 
structure of the law school and the governing arrangements 
which define it are the chief factors in perpetuating the 
practices about which Mr. Kennedy complains. What is 
needed in the law school is a new conception of the roles of 
students and professors in the learning process. Students 
must be encouraged to take more responsibility for their 
own education; professors must be taught to work with 
students and not at them, to guide but not to limit. 
Students and professors must begin to relate as peers, 
learning from the subject matter and from one another. The 
law professor must learn to admit that for many of the legal 
problems which must now be faced, he possesses neither 
adequate empirical data, nor sophisticated conceptual 
frameworks, nor imaginative practical solutions. In such 
cases, the learning process must become a mutual explora-
tion by the professor and his students. The breakdown in 
institutionalized role patterns inherent in the restructuring 
process would provide the necessary basis for better 
relationships between professors and students. 
The most impassioned arguments against radical 
restructuring of the law school have been made by many 
faculty members and some of the more conservative 
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students. Ad hominem attacks on students suggesting 
reform and statements predicting imminent destruction of 
the institution abound, but more reasoned criticisms have 
also been forwarded. Five major themes can be discerned. 
The first is that the law school's responsibility to other 
constituencies-the profession, the councils of state, 
alumni, the university, the law firms-equals that which it 
owes to students. The faculty, it is claimed, is the body best 
suited to represent all of the constituencies of the school. If 
students were to share in the decision-making process, 
then all of these constituents would have the right to claim 
an equal share. Since this is impossible, the faculty must 
retain the role of guiding the institution in the best interests 
of all. 
No one suggests that the law school has no other 
constituencies than students in the sense the term is meant 
in the argument. Indeed, much of the turmoil in the law 
school concerns the question of who the school's constitu-
ents are and who they should be. The groups mentioned 
above are consumers of the graduates of the institution. By 
definition, the poor, who are in desperate need of legal 
assistance, are equally constituents of the school. If the 
faculty can claim to represent the interests of the profes-
sion and the alumni, surely the student body, which 
includes minority group members and students who have 
come from or worked with impoverished communities, can 
claim to represent the other "constituents." In any case, 
the learning process is a matter between the student and 
the teacher. It is based upon their communication, and the 
role of other "constituents" can only be secondary. 
The actual basis for the argument is that the faculty are 
better qualified to direct the affairs of the school than 
students. To an extent this is true. Few would deny that 
many faculty members have a broader understanding of 
legal education than students. To deduce from that fact the 
need for absolute faculty control over the school is rather 
absurd. The views of the faculty would surely be treated 
with great respect in any governing council. Their better 
qualifications would give them greater influence, but would 
hardly justify a monopoly of power. 
The second faculty criticism is that periodic restructur-
ing would destroy continuity in the law school and make 
serious scholarship impossible. Students, it is argued, would 
force other students to adhere to the present fads in 
education, and constant flux would result. 
Continuity is a legitimate concern in the law school and 
in legal education. But periodic reconstitution of the 
governing arrangements does not threaten educational 
continuity. The process of reconstitution, by demanding 
consensus and insuring compromise, would inherently 
protect the continuity of the institution. Faculty members 
would find that students have a deep respect for their 
educational views, a respect which extends even to matters 
of school governance; continuity would have influential and 
concerned spokesmen in the reconstituting process. 
This is not to say that reconstitution will not lead to 
significant reforms in the structure of the law school and in 
legal education. The alternative to such reforms is 
stagnation and the consequent threat of destructive 
upheaval. Continuity is only one value, and must be 
balanced against this danger, and against the increased 
flexibility, diversity, and experimentation which are the 
goals of the reconstitution process·. 
The third objection of the faculty to reform in the law 
school is that it threatens "academic freedom." This claim 
has been made repeatedly in response to anything from 
grading reform to curricular changes. But reconstitution 
would not endanger the principle that professors may 
think, speak, and teach what they deem appropriate. 
Students have not called for the dismissal of a professor 
because he writes for the National Review (and there are no 
professors who write for the Daily Worker). Students 
have not suggested that anyone who believes in strict 
construction of the Constitution must leave the school. 
The faculty, however, has tended to equate academic 
freedom with the space and status which they possess in the 
law school. Professors claim that they must be free to teach 
whatever courses they want, however they want, and that 
they must have total freedom in how they spend their time. 
In at least one respect, this is just nonsense. The freedom 
of the faculty has always been limited by institutional 
responsibilities. Faculty members may feel free to teach 
what they wish, but someone always offers each of the 
basic courses, and professors do not teach Evidence out of 
love. Nor can such a claim be reconciled with tenure 
standards, which, by demanding published work, discrimi-
nate against professors who prefer to practice in their spare 
time, or prefer clinical education to the teaching of 
appellate opinions gathered for a future book. 
There is no question that reconstitution would lead to a 
change in the conception of faculty responsibility. In 
demanding greater space, students have suggested that their 
involvement in the educational process requires that they as 
well as the faculty be given some degree of academic 
freedom. They, too, must have the opportunity to pursue 
questions that interest them. Such freedom is expressed not 
by giving students the right to leave the institution, nor by 
giving them freedom in course selection when courses offer 
no real alternatives in teaching techniques, subject matter 
and political perspectives; but rather by steps which will 
lead to the creation of a true diversity in the law school. 
These steps could include the employment of new 
professors and the encouragement of experimentation by 
present faculty members. Reconstitution of the law school 
and the addition of a student voice in the making of 
curricular decisions will place a greater strain on the 
resources of the institution; it will not necessarily impose 
new restraints upon the freedom of the faculty. 
The question of faculty time, as outlined by Mr. 
Kennedy, would be discussed by the whole community. 
The reconstituting convention would consider the balance 
to be struck between personal freedom and institutional 
responsibility. No doubt the faculty would demand 
protection against coercion as part of a bill of rights. The 
vast majority of students would surely accede to this 
demand, and the discussion itself would provide a better 
understanding between students and faculty about the 
concerns of each. 
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The fourth argument favored by the faculty is that, with 
structural reform, the law school would become factional-
ized, forcing faculty members to spend their time in 
political maneuvering. There are several basic responses to 
such criticism. The law school is already faction-ridden and 
politicized, and will remain so until its institutional 
arrangements gain some modicum of legitimacy. It is 
certainly preferable for the members of the law school to 
discuss reform in an appropriate forum than to spend hours 
responding to recurrent and continually escalating crises. 
Further, faculty views would be better represented in open 
discussion than in hostile confrontations. Finally, the 
process of reconstitution is predicated upon a willingness to 
experiment; given such willingness, continual nose-counting 
should not be necessary. 
The final argument used against restructuring is that it 
would undermine the quality of the institution. Good 
professors and good students, content with traditional 
approaches, would go elsewhere. At Yale, this is known as 
the "for God, for country, and for Yale" argument. But it 
is those law schools which are unwilling to accept the need 
for reform which face certain decline. Student discontent 
can only increase. To await the revival of the political 
quiescence which characterized the fifties is foolhardy, and 
will only hasten the deterioration of the law school. To 
eliminate dissident students either by a quiet purge or 
through the admissions process is theoretically possible, but 
can be done only at great cost-the sacrifice of intellectual 
honesty and excitement. 
If reconstitution succeeds, it will preserve the institu-
tion. A widespread exodus of faculty would be averted by 
the protections which emerged from the constituting 
process. To many professors, the experiment would be a 
stimulating response to this "time of troubles" for the law 
school. The renewed classroom interest and increased 
intellectual excitement caused by the clash of differing 
ideas and perceptions would reward both students and 
faculty. If reconstitution fails, it will be because the law 
school as a viable institution has failed. 
In the end, the difficulties and risks attendant upon 
reconstition are of lesser importance than the answer to the 
normative question: how should institutions be ordered? A 
proposal for periodic reconstitution represents the belief 
that institutions must be democratically organized. 
Insituticinal arrangements must be representative and fluid, 
responsible to and agreeable to all members of the 
institution. To exist as a stimulating center of learning, the 
law school must redefine and legitimate its goals and its 
structure. When institutional arrangements exist for too 
long without review, they become their own raison d'etre. 
The law school has reached that point. Its members should 
now dedicate themselves to the task of its restructuring. 
1. Different conceptions of the role of the law school have been 
discussed in the past. At Yale Law School, in the thirties, for 
example, the legal realists attempted to change the law school in 
form to a graduate school, and in function to a center of study on 
governmental regulation (i.e. of public interest law). It is not 
unenlightening that it was during the depression that conceptions of 
institutional responsibility to the public interest were articulated. 
Like many of the bold thoughts of the early depression, the reform 
movement died during the war. 
2. I do not mean to suggest that the educational hustle was unique 
to the law school, and that the traits engendered were functional 
only to legal occupations. I do maintain that the view of education 
as a hustle acquired particularly strong prevalence in the law school, 
and that the personal traits were there developed in their extreme 
form. 
3. If one shares Mr. Kennedy's penchant for musing about 
psychology, one might speculate that the hippies come to the law 
school for reasons which make their alienation inevitable: to avoid 
the draft, to fulfill parental ambitions, to hedge for future security, 
because of ambivalence towards "success." The faculty tends to 
dismiss them as unfit for the law school, because they do not wish 
to be "professionals." That is undeniable if the faculty definition of 
that term is accepted. As for their motivation for entering law 
school, one might suggest that all of the above factors would have 
been equally served by going to graduate school. 
4. The distinction between "radicals" and "hippies" is rather 
tenuous, because the membership of the two groups is intermixed; 
the"hippies" tend to be quite political, and the "radicals" tend to 
adopt the youth culture life style. However, members of the hippie 
group tend to be much more alienated and isolated from the 
institution than radicals. 
Since radicals tend to be less bearded or disheveled than 
hippies, they seem to be more acceptable to the faculty and 
straighter students. Indeed radicals in the school (which by faculty 
definition includes anyone to the left of HHH) tend to be lionized 
by professors and straighter students. Both groups frequently listen 
to the viewpoints of such students, both for titillation and, 
presumably (kudos to Mr. Kennedy) to assuage their feelings of 
insecurity and guilt. The "house radical" has replaced the "token 
negro" in liberal parties and discussions, perhaps because black 
students will generally not serve that role any longer. 
Legal hippies tend to avoid such situations. This may be due 
not only to the life style, but also to the fact that hippies may be 
the only white radicals in the school. I would accept, without any 
way to question it, an argument that the hippies are generally 
further to the "left" on any scale of political ranking than the 
putative radicals. 
5. The reconstitution would probably become a yearly activity of 
the school. Since much of the activity of the constituting 
convention would be discussion, yearly meetings would be a good 
means of allowing the community to evaluate its efforts, direction, 
etc. The reconstitution of structures would probably have to occur 
at regular intervals once a year, or every two or three years. Since 
the law school will undoubtedly remain in flux as it undergoes 
change, it is best the institutions be approved by the community at 
frequent intervals. In times of flux, no doubt, any institutional 
arrangement agreeable to all will be somewhat unsatisfactory to all. 
A periodic reconstitution will make compromise easier, as it will not 
require commitment for three generations. 
6. I must emphasize exactly what I am suggesting. The convention 
of all the members of the law school would decide what would be 
and who would be on the governing arrangements of the law school. 
It would decide the rules under which the institution would be 
governed. It would discuss educational reform, working conditions 
etc. I am not suggesting that educational planning take place in 
community meetings. I am suggesting that discussion of major ideas 
for courses, programs and changes in legal education must take 
place, and that, perhaps, the convention would provide guidelines 
for immediate reforms. The decision-making would still be done in 
committees and school council meetings. 
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The decisions which the convention made would require 
consensus approval for adoption. That is, vocal opposition from any 
one group in the school (faculty, black students, female students, 
radicals, hippies, moderates, etc.) would defeat a proposal. Majority 
voting would not safeguard the interests of any one group; 
unanimity would be impossible. A strong consensus vote is the only 
alternative. 
7. This type of talk is incredibly dangerous and always counter-
productive. For students to threaten the faculty with talk of the 
inevitability of mass resignations does not help bring about reform 
in the Jaw school. The language of the faculty is even more 
reprehensible. As a classic elite which controls the law school, they 
must comprehend the responsibilities which such power imparts. For 
professors to convince themselves that the problems of the law 
school would vanish if "these people" were kicked out is not only 
illusory, it is incredibly licentious behavior for men who possess 
power. By popularizing that line among other faculty and.students, 
professors have created a situation which is ripe for purge of the students 
who "shouldn't be here." Such students cannot help perceiving this 
threat, and responding to it. Paranoia thus increases in the Jaw 
school, and behavior becomes more and more manic. 
8. I do not mean to suggest that the convention meetings would 
always be rational and calm. I have no doubt that many participants 
would merely rap and that tempers would be lost more than once. 
At first, such conventions would undoubtedly be very difficult. The 
commitment to change, however, would take the edge off the anger 
and frustration. In any case, such communication must take place. 
The law school cannot continue to function with isolated groups 
and minimal communication. The convention takes faculty and 
students out of their roles and makes them talk with each other. 
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